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Bob Weinberg 
The Politics of Remembering: The Treatment 
of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union 
THESECONDWORLDWARWASTHEDEFININGMOMENTOFTHESOVIET 
Union. The war extracted an incredible toll on the Soviet Union: more 
than eight million soldiers and at least seventeen million civilians dead, 
close to two thousand towns and seventy thousand villages razed to the 
ground, and thirty thousand industrial enterprises destroyed. Millions 
of Soviet citizens survived the war as homeless refugees, and many 
others suffered permanent physical damage and lifelong psychological 
trauma as a result of the hostilities. But the Red Army's triumphant 
march into Berlin in late April 1945 and the unconditional surrender 
of Germany on May 9 prompted many Soviet citizens to attribute vic-
tory over fascism to the policies of Stalin. The Soviet Union's heroic 
effort to turn back the German invaders and then rout the enemy's 
retreating troops proved the mettle not only of the Stalinist system 
but also the Soviet people who collectively endured four years of war. 
To many Soviets, the sacrifices and bloodletting that characterized 
the building of socialism since the late 1920s had their payoff in the 
Soviet Union's defeat of Germany. As one Soviet friend told me while 
we watched fireworks televised on May 9, 1983, to commemorate 
the thirty-eighth anniversary of Germany's surrender, "except for de-
feating Hitler and his army, we Soviets have nothing to be proud 0£" 
Or consider the story told to me by an American colleague who, 
while riding a bus in Moscow in 1983, witnessed the following scene. 
An elderly woman, laden with several bags brimming over with po-
tatoes and onions, boarded the crowded bus. She began berating a 
twentysomething man who did not relinquish his seat, insisting that 
she deserved a seat because she had liberated Berlin in 1945 just so 
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he could live the good life in the early 1980s. At the same time, other 
passengers-young, middle-aged and old, men and women, some 
standing, some sitting-felt it was their civic duty to add their two 
cents and joined the ad hominem attack on the man. After enduring 
several minutes of this verbal lashing, the young man looked at the 
woman and shouted, ''I've had enough talk about the war. I'm sick 
and tired of hearing how you saved the Soviet Union. I didn't ask you 
to march into Germany." 
Similarly, the wartime experiences of those Soviet Jews who had 
the good fortune to survive Germany's war of annihilation served 
as a reference point for their post-1945 lives. As my elderly Russian 
aunt responded when my wife inquired in 1995 how life in post-
Communist Russia was treating her, "What can be bad about my life 
now? The Germans aren't on their way, and there's no famine." Born in 
1919, she spent most of the war years as an evacuee from Moscow in 
a town near Lake Baikal, several thousand miles from the atrocities of 
the Final Solution. Yet her comment underscores the extent to which 
she has carried throughout her adult life the memories of the tragedy 
that befell her country when she was a young woman. 1 Close to two 
million of the nearly six million Jews killed by the Germans lived on 
Soviet territory when the war broke out. Members of the Einsatzgrup-
pen shot well over a million Jews, while hundreds of thousands died in 
ghettos, in transit to the camps, or in the extermination camps. Thus, 
the history of the Holocaust is integrally linked to the history of Soviet 
Jewry, and neither can be explored and understood in isolation. 
Given the impact of the war on Soviet society, it is not surprising 
that the Kremlin mobilized its resources to memorialize the Soviet 
Union's heroic and triumphant efforts against Germany. A cottage 
industry of books, films, plays, and public ceremonies developed in 
the decades after 1945, reaching its apex in the late 1970s and early 
1980s when the Brezhnev regime relied on the public commemora-
tion of the war to provide the social and political cohesion that was 
sorely in need of bolstering. 2 But when it came to addressing the 
specifically anti-Jewish aspects of German policy and the particular 
suffering experienced by Soviet Jews, Soviet historians were, for the 
most part, silent. For a host of political reasons (as will be discussed), 
the Soviet authorities instructed historians to refrain from mentioning 
the specifically Jewish nature of the genocide carried out on Soviet 
territory. Historians either overlooked the attempted extermination 
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of Soviet Jewry or submerged the trauma suffered by Jews in a grocery 
list of Soviet citizens of all nationalities and ethnicities who fell victim 
to the German invaders. The flap over the memorial at Babi Yar is 
undoubtedly the most publicized example of the Soviet Union's refusal 
to acknowledge the Jewish genocide. As Zvi Gitelman, a leading expert 
on the history of Soviet Jewry, asserts: 
I know of no book published in the USSR that sought to explain 
the Holocaust as sui generis. In fact, the term "Holocaust" is com-
pletely unknown in the Soviet literature. In discussions of the de-
struction of the Jews, terms "annihilation" (unichtozhenie) or "ca-
tastrophe" (katastrofa) have been used. It is only recently that the 
"Holocaust," transliterated from English, has appeared.3 
Indeed, the scholarly interest in documenting and explaining the 
Holocaust, so widespread in the United States, Israel, and Europe, was 
virtually nonexistent during the Soviet era. One can search in vain 
high school and college textbooks and official histories of the war for 
any mention ofJews, anti-Semitism, and extermination camps. 
Notwithstanding the desire to expunge from the historical record 
any mention of Jews, the Kremlin did not adopt a consistent policy 
of suppressing information about the Holocaust in the postwar era. 
Indeed, Soviet scholars did not avoid the topic altogether. This essay 
explores what Soviet historians wrote-and chose not to write-about 
the Holocaust from 1945 to 1991 in an effort to uncover the political 
and ideological calculus that shaped Soviet scholarship on the topic. 
Information about the Holocaust was available to Soviet citizens both 
during and after the war, though its amount and quality varied during 
the post-1945 period. The remainder of this essay focuses on how So-
viet treatment of the killing of some two million of its Jewish citizens 
during World War II reflected the changing concerns of the Kremlin 
between 194 5 and 1991. By American, Israeli, and Western European 
standards, Soviet scholarship fell way short of providing a satisfactory 
discussion and analysis of the Final Solution, and examination of the 
political concerns of the Soviet leadership sheds light on the selective 
memory of Soviet historians. 4 
Contrary to those accounts that stress the ignorance of Soviet Jews 
regarding what to expect from the Germans when they invaded in 
June 1941, Mordechai Altshuler notes that Soviet Jews did have access 
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to information about the German government's persecution of Jews 
in countries under its control.5 To be sure, no one inside the Soviet 
Union could have known about the planned annihilation of Soviet 
Jews because of the secrecy surrounding Operation Barbarossa. But 
as Altshuler argues, unofficial channels of transmitting news coexisted 
with the prohibition of publicizing the anti-Jewish policies of the 
Germans in the official media that was in effect between the signing of 
the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in mid-1939 and the outbreak 
of the war nearly two years later. For example, the Soviet occupation 
of eastern Poland in mid-September 1939 prompted hundreds of 
thousands of Polish Jews with firsthand experience of German cruelty 
to cross the new border into territory annexed by the Soviet Union. 
The same holds for those Polish Jews who escaped the Germans by 
seeking a safe haven in the Baltic countries that the Soviet Union an-
nexed. Even after the Soviets and Germans sealed the borders of their 
newly acquired territories, Jews still found it possible to cross over to 
the Soviet Union with the help of smugglers. Many of these refugees 
subsequently obtained Soviet citizenship and moved elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union, where they told others of what life was like under the 
Germans. Moreover, letters and other accounts from people caught in 
German-controlled Poland still managed to find their way to friends 
and relatives on the other side of the border. Altshuler concludes that 
it "is hard to believe that this relatively large quantity of information, 
flowing through diverse channels (individuals, letters, attestations), 
remained hidden from very broad segments of the Jewish public."6 
Altshuler also notes that prior to September 1939, the official So-
viet media published accounts of the mistreatment ofJews in Germany, 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Articles appeared in the mainstream 
Russian-language press such as Pravda and Izvestiia as well as the Yid-
dish newspaper Der Shtern, where details of attacks on Jews, incarcera-
tion in concentration camps, burning of synagogues, and destruction 
of Jewish property were presented in graphic detail. The flow of this 
information picked up after Kristallnacht in November 1938 and no 
doubt served to make Soviet Jews aware of German brutality. In ad-
dition, the films Professor Mamlok and Ihe Family Oppenheim, Soviet 
productions from 1938, were favorably reviewed by critics and ran in 
theaters and factories until the signing of the nonaggression pact in 
mid-1939 put an end to the appearance of negative news about the 
Soviet Union's new ally.7 
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Not surprisingly, the Kremlin lifted the prohibition on official 
information about the Germans' brutal treatment of Jews within 
days of the German invasion. Articles about the Germans' anti-Jewish 
atrocities quickly reappeared in the national and local press, and radio 
stations aired shows describing the travails endured by Jews in ter-
ritories under German control. Moreover, the Germans themselves 
publicized what Soviet Jews could expect. Leaflets dropped from planes 
and radio broadcasts disseminated German propaganda, advertising 
the German military's intention to annihilate both Jews and Bolshe-
viks. In other words, neither the enemy nor the Soviet authorities 
tried to conceal the fact that Jews were in a dire situation. Altshuler 
concludes that "many Jews, before the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union and a fortiori afterward, were aware of the Nazis' discrimination 
against and persecution of Jews (although they had no information 
about genocide)."8 To be sure, many civilians greeted such news with 
skepticism and preferred to believe that reports of German brutality 
were merely Kremlin propaganda. Still others, particularly those who 
could remember the Great War, had trouble reconciling these reports 
with their recollections of German rule a generation earlier. Finally, 
those Jews who considered Soviet power as their chief enemy reasoned 
that Hitler had to be a preferable ruler to Stalin.9 
For the duration of the war, Soviet authorities did not conceal 
information about the genocide of the Jews. As Lukasz Hirszowicz 
points out, "a considerable amount of material about the Holocaust 
... appeared in the Soviet Union during the war and its immediate 
aftermath."Io For example, the government instructed the writers Ilya 
Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman to lead a commission devoted to the 
documentation of the German murder of Soviet Jewry. They printed 
a typescript of their findings (known as the Black Book) in 1946, but 
within a year the authorities decided to prohibit its publication be-
cause of the shift in the political and ideological climate. In 1948, the 
Kremlin ordered the destruction of all copies of the manuscript, along 
with the typescript, but the Black Book nonetheless soon appeared in 
Hebrew and English translations because the manuscript had already 
been sent abroad. An Israeli publisher also issued the Russian version, 
but the fact remains that no version of the Black Book was published 
in the Soviet Union. I I In addition, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Commit-
tee, established in the middle of the war in order to drum up foreign 
support (financial and moral) for the Soviet Union, helped publicize 
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the horrors of the Germans' concerted effort to kill all Soviet Jews. 12 
Furthermore, details of the Nuremburg trials also appeared in the 
official media. In a similar vein, the Russian and Yiddish versions of 
the daily newspaper published in Birobidzhan, capital of the Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast, printed letters from displaced Soviet Jews who 
survived the German onslaught and were seeking a new life in Birobid-
zhan, the putative national enclave of Soviet Jewry. The Jewish theater 
troupe ofBirobidzhan staged the production of He Is from the Ghetto, 
a play about the Jewish uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. 13 
Notwithstanding these events, the suppression of the Black Book 
signaled the Kremlin's growing ambivalence and discomfort with any 
specific mention of the Holocaust. Undoubtedly, the anti-Semitic hys-
teria that had begun to characterize certain aspects of Stalin's domestic 
and foreign policies, and reached a crescendo in the campaign against 
"rootless cosmopolitans" and the Doctors' Plot during Stalin's final 
years, certainly played a role in the decision to downplay the special 
nature of the Germans' treatment of the Jews. 14 But several other issues 
merit consideration in any explanation of why the Soviet authorities 
silenced discussion of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union. First, pub-
lication and discussion of these materials, especially those compiled 
by Ehrenburg and Grossman, raised the very uncomfortable issue 
of collaboration by Soviet citizens, particularly those Ukrainian and 
Latvian civilians who assisted the Germans in their slaughter ofJews. 
The fact that significant numbers of Soviet citizens were traitors to the 
Soviet cause threw into doubt the Kremlin's claim that the Communist 
regime enjoyed the unconditional support of the populace. 15 
Second, the Soviet authorities realized that social and political 
cohesion would be better served by not treating the Jewish genocide 
as a unique phenomenon. As Solomon Schwarz noted more than fifty 
years ago, the Kremlin worried that highlighting Hitler's belief that the 
war against the Soviet Union stemmed from his war against the Jews 
would weaken "civilian and military morale." 16 In a sad commentary 
on the persistence of popular anti-Semitism, the Soviet leadership 
worried that non-Jewish Soviets would be susceptible to German 
propaganda and blame the Jews for the horrors visited upon all Soviet 
citizens, thereby weakening their resolve to combat the enemy. Put 
bluntly, the Kremlin did not want Soviet citizens to believe they were 
fighting to protect the Jews. It is therefore not surprising that already 
during the war the Soviet authorities took efforts to minimize the 
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unique nature of the Germans' campaign to exterminate Soviet Jewry. 
For example, they instructed the commission set up to gather evidence 
of the Germans' murder of Jews to omit any mention that Jews were 
the victims. The Kremlin also told the commission to minimize the 
role played by Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans in 
the mass shootings and massacres ofJews. 17 
Finally, the elation with which many Soviet Jews greeted the es-
tablishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 and the enthusiastic 
welcome accorded Golda Meir, head of the Israeli legation that visited 
Moscow in the fall, bolstered suspicions among many in the Kremlin 
that Soviet Jewry was not loyal to the Soviet Union. In addition, the 
rising tide of official anti-Semitic policies and pronouncements gave 
many Soviet Jews good reason to take pride in Israel, particularly 
because they could not but notice that the regime had deliberately 
turned its back on them and had no interest in examining the wartime 
travails of Soviet Jewry. 18 
By the end of the 1940s, this tendency to avoid mentioning the 
German effort to annihilate Soviet Jewry had become the norm and 
remained as such until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The overwhelming number of books published about the war years, 
from memoirs and novels to document collections and monographs, 
maintained a silence regarding the genocide of Soviet Jews. In one 
incident, the Soviet censors excised from the diary of a Jewish girl who 
endured ghetto life any mention of her Jewishness. 19 Yet it bears noting 
that the Soviets never denied that the Germans murdered six million 
Jews. Nor did they deny that the Germans targeted European Jewry 
for extermination. Instead, Soviet treatments tended to conflate the 
victimization of Soviet Jewry with the sufferings endured by all Soviet 
citizens. Such an approach demystified the Holocaust and eliminated 
the need to explain the mass murder of six million Jews because the Fi-
nal Solution "was seen as an integral part of a larger phenomenon-the 
murder of civilians-whether Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, 
Gypsies, or other nationalities. It was said to be a natural consequence 
of racist fascism," which in turn was the inevitable consequence of the 
paroxysms of capitalism in its death throes. 20 In other words, Soviet 
treatments of the war years universalized the murder of Soviet Jews, 
relegating them to a place on the list of Soviet victims of fascism and 
at times even erasing any mention of their Jewishness. It was common 
practice to refer to Jewish resistance fighters, soldiers, and victims as 
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"Soviet," thereby conveying the impression that Jews were not special 
targets of the Germans and may not have distinguished themselves 
in combat. From the perspective of the ideologues in the Kremlin, 
there was no need to point out what Jews experienced during the war, 
especially if the sense of Jewish victimhood could fuel Jewish national 
feelings and foster a sense of entitlement. The authorities also wor-
ried that underscoring the Jewish nature of the Final Solution could 
spark resentment among non-Jewish Soviets who also suffered at the 
hands of the Germans. All Soviet citizens were targets of Germany's 
racial profiling during the war, especially ethnic Russians, and Jews 
found themselves mentioned along with the myriad nationalities and 
ethnicities that also endured Germany's campaign for Lebensraum and 
destruction of communism. 
Stalin's death in 1953 did very little to alter the general approach 
of Soviet treatments of the Holocaust. Still, this does not mean that 
all mention ofJews, including even highlighting the special treatment 
meted out to Jews, vanished. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet media 
did not shy away from covering war crimes trials conducted in West 
Germany and even the Soviet Union. Along with the fascination 
generated by the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann in the early 
1960s, the specific nature of these trials made it difficult to avoid 
mention of the Jewish victims. In addition, Sovetish heymland, the 
Yiddish monthly published in Moscow from 1961 to 1991, saw fit 
to print stories, poems, memoirs, and documentary material on the 
Holocaust in "almost every issue."21 But how many Soviet citizens, Jews 
and non-Jews, could read Yiddish? Only a few publications appeared 
in the post-Stalin years that offered honest assessments of the Final 
Solution on Soviet territory, with explicit attention paid to the Jewish 
ghettos and mass executions of Soviet Jews. 22 Still, the vast majority 
of publications erased any mention of the Jewishness of Soviet victims 
from the historical record. 
However, it is the controversy over building a monument to 
the thirty-three thousand Jews of Kiev murdered at Babi Yar in 
September 1941 that best illustrates the desire to downplay public 
recognition of the Holocaust. The public clamor to erect a memorial 
at Babi Yar crystallized a movement demanding that the Kremlin 
acknowledge the existence of anti-Semitism and commemorate the 
murder of thirty-three thousand Soviet Jews. With his poem "Babi 
Yar," the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko in the early 1960s catapulted 
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the issue onto the world stage, opening a festering wound that Soviet 
society had been living with for nearly twenty years. The world-
famous Dmitry Shostakovich also added his imprimatur to the inci-
dent by including Yevtushenko's poem in his Thirteenth Symphony 
and thereby earning the wrath of the authorities, who prohibited 
public performances of the composition for several years. While 
Yevtushenko and his supporters prevailed by convincing the Krem-
lin to establish a memorial at Babi Yar, their victory was a hollow 
one and fell short of what they wanted. The inscription refers to the 
one hundred thousand "citizens of Kiev and prisoners of war" who 
perished at the hands of German soldiers in 1941 and 1942 at Babi 
Yar. The authorities obviously did not want to sanctify Babi Yar as 
a site of Jewish victimization because doing so would run against 
the grain of policy and threaten to offend the sensibilities of non-
Jewish Soviet citizens who also lost friends and relatives at Babi Yar. 
And when the Kremlin authorized performances of Shostakovich's 
Thirteenth Symphony, Yevtushenko first had to amend the poem 
to include mention of Russian and Ukrainian victims and highlight 
how Russia resisted the Germans. Not surprisingly, the authorities' 
decision inflamed Jewish sensibilities both inside and outside the 
Soviet Union, and the controversy continued until the end of the 
Communist regime. In the late 1980s, the city fathers added another 
plaque to the memorial. Written in Yiddish, the plaque amazingly 
does not mention Jews. It was only after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent country 
in 1991 that a fitting memorial commemorating the Jewish victims 
at Babi Yar was erected. This new memorial was in the shape of a 
menorah with Yiddish and Hebrew texts that refer to Jews. But it is 
located at a spot some distance from the original monument.23 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the political calculus 
of the successor states, including the Russian Federation, offering 
historians and politicians alike a chance to reconsider their countries' 
wartime experiences, especially in terms of their relationships toward 
Jews and Germans. But the collapse of communism did not mean 
that discussion of the Holocaust became depoliticized throughout the 
former Soviet Union. To the contrary, in some countries examination 
of what happened to Jews during World War II remained a sensitive 
and contentious matter, particularly when it intersected with the ef-
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forts of these newly independent states to reverse the effects of decades 
of Moscow rule. For example, Zvi Gitelman notes that in September 
1991 the Lithuanian government, soon after the Kremlin recognized 
its independence, pardoned close to one thousand Lithuanians whom 
postwar Soviet tribunals found guilty of collaborating with the Ger-
mans. The approach adopted by the Lithuanian government was simple 
and direct: any Lithuanian judged guilty by the Soviet authorities must 
have been innocent. Not unexpectedly, Israeli and Jewish observers of 
these events protested and convinced the government to reconsider 
the rehabilitation of the collaborators. The government also estab-
lished a joint commission of experts from Israel, the United States, 
and Lithuania to examine the records and trials of the convicted col-
laborators. But resolution of the issue has not been reached, largely 
because American and Israeli members of the commission refused to 
accept the Lithuanian proposal that equates Jewish and Lithuanian 
suffering during and after the war. In addition, the proposal also tries 
to expunge from the historical record the responsibility of Lithuania 
for the genocide of the Jews. 24 
Clearly, then, the issue of collaboration still resonates in the for-
mer Soviet Union, not only affecting Jewish-gentile relations but also 
highlighting the political capital that the Holocaust still possesses. 
For example, in Ukraine a number ofindependent Jewish researchers 
studying the fate of Ukrainian Jews during the war have published 
historical accounts of the Final Solution based on documents and in-
terviews with survivors. But as Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern points out 
in a recent essay, these researchers affix responsibility for the atrocities 
to Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the Germans. Fur-
thermore, Petrovsky-Shtern believes that these independent scholars 
use the study of the Holocaust as a way to "attain political and social 
importance within the Jewish community and attract the attention 
of the Ukrainian authorities; ... Holocaust studies are used as an in-
strument of struggle for power in the Jewish community in Ukraine 
at large."25 In contrast to this self-serving effort to blame Ukrainian 
extremists as the instigators of the Final Solution, a group of presum-
ably non-Jewish scholars connected to official institutions revert to 
the scholarly practices of the Soviet period and make no mention of 
the role of Ukrainian collaborators. According to Petrovsky-Shtern, 
a disturbing revisionist trend has emerged that seeks to sweep under 
the carpet the participation of Ukrainians in the Final Solution and 
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promote a view of Ukrainian history in which Jews and Ukrainians 
lived in friendly, peaceful coexistence. 26 
On the other hand, since the early 1990s, the government of in-
dependent Ukraine has been sincerely trying to rectify the mistakes of 
the past. In Ukraine, where large numbers of Ukrainians collaborated 
with the Germans in liquidating ghettos, rounding up and execut-
ing Jews, and fighting the Red Army, the Ukrainian government has 
made a concerted effort to mend Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The 
government has helped sponsor annual commemorations of the Babi 
Yar massacre and has rejected the relativization of the Holocaust that 
characterized Soviet treatments of the subject. 27 In addition, officials in 
many of the major centers ofJewish residence during the Soviet period 
helped sponsor conferences, memorials, public gatherings, and other 
events commemorating the Holocaust.28 Finally, Alfonsas Eidintas, 
Lithuania's ambassador to Israel in 2001, has edited a collection of 
documents and articles on the Holocaust in Lithuanian by prominent 
Lithuanian intellectuals of various political stripes.29 
In post-Soviet Russia, the end of Communist rule provided favor-
able conditions for a burgeoning field of Holocaust studies. By the 
mid-1990s, local centers devoted to the study of the Holocaust had 
sprouted up, often at the behest of professional historians interested 
in publishing and educating the public about the genocide of Soviet 
Jews. The Center for Research and Education on the Holocaust, lo-
cated in Moscow, established a series entitled The Russian Library of 
the Holocaust30 and published the papers from a 1994 international 
symposium entitled Lessons of the Holocaust and Contemporary Rus-
sia. 31 Under the direction ofllyaAltman, the center has issued several 
document collections pertaining to the Holocaust, including one 
designed for pre-university-level teachers entitled Istoriia Kholokosta, 
1933-1945 gg.: Paket-komplekt dokumental'nykh materialov (1995). 
Edited by D. I. Poltorak, the documents, which include selections from 
Hitler's Mein Kampf, along with diaries, memoirs, statistical records, 
official SS reports, and assorted photographs, come with lesson plans 
replete with discussion questions and possible assignments. The center 
has also organized traveling exhibitions and helped train teachers. In 
addition, the Institute ofJewish Studies in Kiev promotes research on 
the Holocaust in Ukraine. 32 
At the same time, the opening of the archives of the former Soviet 
Union and the ability of archivists at Yad Vashem in Israel and the 
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United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to microfilm materials 
from these repositories has been a boon to the study of the Holocaust 
on Soviet territory. Several journals from Russia, England, Israel, and 
the United States publish on a regular basis articles written by scholars 
from the former Soviet Union who utilize documents preserved 
in archives in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and the Baltic states. 33 In addi-
tion, Jewish Soviet war veterans have undertaken efforts to preserve 
the historical memory of the Holocaust, and Jewish researchers have 
published memorial books about the vanished Jewish communities. 
Complementing this flurry of interest in the Holocaust is the pub-
lication of books and articles by scholars investigating the Kremlin's 
policies toward Jews before, during, and after the war. Still, the ability 
to publish openly on the Holocaust has not led scholars in the former 
Soviet Union to break significant new ground and offer fresh analyses 
of the genocide of Soviet Jews. 
Despite the recent advances, the dissemination of information 
about the Holocaust in the Soviet Union lags behind the explosive 
growth of Holocaust studies in the United States and elsewhere. Mate-
rial on the Holocaust tends to appear in publications issued by Jewish 
organizations whose readership is primarily the small circle of scholars 
interested in the Final Solution in the Soviet Union. In addition, some 
of the articles that have appeared are Russian translations of articles 
written by American, English, and Israeli scholars. The following 
incident underscores the failure of the Soviet academic establishment 
to address the tragedy of the Holocaust. In July 1995, I spent some of 
my spare time perusing recent publications about Soviet history and 
World War II, interested in learning what the spate of books com-
memorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war contained 
about the Holocaust. I browsed the offerings of the major bookstores 
in the city and came up empty-handed. 
However, a more recent endeavor in May 2003 revealed that 
historians are now paying attention to the Holocaust in general and 
the killing of Soviet Jews in particular. For example, a textbook on 
the history of the Soviet Union designed for high school and college 
students offers a concise but accurate discussion of the genocide of 
Soviet Jews. Not only do the authors of the text note that Germany's 
war aims targeted "Jewish Bolshevism," but they assert that the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union coincided with the decision regarding the 
Final Solution. More significant is the authors' decision to underscore 
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how many Soviet citizens, "especially those with strong antisemitic 
feelings," collaborated with the Germans. Unfortunately, the authors 
offer discredited information such as when they (on the one hand) 
assert that four million persons died at Auschwitz-Birkenau and (on 
the other hand) underestimate the number of Soviet Jews who perished 
at the hands of the Germans. 34 In addition, an April 2003 issue of 
Novoe vremia, the Russian equivalent of Newsweek or Time, published 
two articles discussing the Warsaw Ghetto and the 1943 uprising as 
well as the silence of Soviet historians regarding these events. 35 So it 
seems as if the Russian public is slowly but gradually receiving ex-
posure to the history of the Holocaust, though it bears noting that a 
2001 textbook on the history of Russia, also designed for high school 
and college students, does not mention the Holocaust or the fate of 
European and Soviet Jewry. 36 
Still, the progress post-Soviet scholars have made since the early 
1990s is commendable and augurs well for the future treatment of 
the Holocaust. As historians reexamine and revise the old Soviet his-
toriography of World War II, they will find it difficult to avoid giving 
the Final Solution on Soviet soil the attention that is long overdue. 
The national consolidation of the newly independent countries of the 
former Soviet Union will no doubt proceed apace and alleviate the 
perceived need to hold an honest assessment of the Holocaust hostage 
to the politics of nation building. One can hope that a more open and 
accurate reckoning of the Holocaust will prevail in the scholarship of 
historians working in the former Soviet Union. 
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